Female Muslim students have long been allowed to wear the headscarf, commonly called 'hijab', in Thailand's educational institutions. This issue has been settled over thirty years ago in the four Southern provinces where the majority of the population is Muslim. Although the authority at that time feared that hijab would cause the separation between Muslim and Buddhist students, it was sensibly decided that a ban would be even more divisive ("Common sense must," 2011).
However, this issue rose to national attention again in 2011, when 17 hijab-wearing Muslim students in Bangkok's Nong Chok district with a sizable Muslim minority submitted a letter requesting formal permission to wear hijabs in Wat Nong Chok school. The request was submitted to the Office of Basic Education Commission (OBEC), and was turned down. The reason given was that the school is a Buddhist educational institution situated in the ground of a Buddhist temple (Wat), and therefore, the decision whether students can wear hijab fell under the temple's discretion ("Common sense must," 2011)
Ten months later, over 200 protesters from the Muslim Group for Peace gathered in front of the government house to submit a letter to the Prime Minister, accusing the school of "attempting to violate the rights of the Muslim students to wear headscarves, starting with opposing their entry to the school and not treating them equally with other students" and demanded that Muslim school uniforms be allowed in schools throughout the country ("Protest over Hijab," 2012).
Nichada Dawazaw, a 14-year old student at the school, made an insightful comment when she said, "I still can wear the hijab after school. Besides, the ban, or its lifting, doesn't affect my studies here at all.... The hijab shouldn't be forbidden, nor should it be compulsory for every Muslim student...It should be up to the individual to decide." (Rithdee, 2012).
This issue, however, reveals a deep-rooted trouble at the heart of Thai society as a predominantly Buddhist country: how to accommodate followers of other faiths. The ongoing conflict in the Deep South which has claimed more than 5,000 lives over the past nine years now is also a result of this problem.
Religious intolerance has been on the rise not only in Thailand but also other predominantly Theravada Buddhist countries. In Sri Lanka, the decades-long civil war against the mostly Hindu Tamil Tigers reached its bloody conclusion in 2009, only to witness a new conflict against the Muslim minority. In Myanmar, monks now incited violence against the Rohingya, a large Muslim minority, as communal violence flared up across the country.
In this article, the author proposed a revised look at the model set by the Indian Emperor Asoka, who is also a model for most Buddhist states, as an example of how to integrate religious pluralism in a predominantly Buddhist society.
Although secularism has been an important element of democracy in the West, democratizing societies elsewhere have attempted to integrate religion into the social imaginaire to varying success. As with Sri Lanka and Myanmar, Thailand has never separated Buddhism from the national polity. And this is, it is thought, modeled on the Indian emperor Asoka.
Asoka’s rule as a “dhammiko dhammaraja”, dhamma-practicing king, has served as a model for many Buddhist kings and leaders in Sri Lanka, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand and even China. This is based, however, on the hagiography that grew around him in the Buddhist tradition rather than the inscriptions which were only discovered in the nineteenth century. (Gombrich, 1994, 10)
Asoka was a grandson of Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Mauyan dynasty. In 262 BCE, he made a successful conquest against a neighboring people at Kalinga which consolidated his empire covering most of the Indian subcontinent and parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
But that bloody war was also his turning point. From that point on, he renounced all conquest by force and advocated only moral conquest (dharma-vijaya). In the Rock Edict XIII, he stated that “the Beloved of the Gods [Asoka himself], conqueror of the Kalingas, is moved to remorse now” because the war “involves slaughter, death and deportation.” (Tambiah, 1976, 55)
This has continued to be the case as Tambiah (1976, 430-1) noted “The traditional polities of Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, and so on, have always been Buddhist kingdoms, in the sense that the consciousness of being a political collectivity is tied up with the possession and guardianship of the religion under the aegis of a dharma-practicing Buddhist king… Given this interlaced totality of religion and politics, of national consciousness and religious identity, of righteous morality and politics, it is difficult to see in Thailand a secular nationalism dispensing with Buddhist referents in the near future.”
Unlike neighboring states, Siam was not colonized by Western powers in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910) was under the pressure to give a civilized appearance to Siam and thus avoid being colonized by Western powers. He undertook a rapid reform which included the abolition of slavery and modern form of education in his domain.
Foreshadowing similar phenomenon which would later happen in neighboring countries when emerging from colonial domination, King Chulalongkorn was faced with the question of formulating a national identity to unify his vast domain. And like in several countries, religion proved to be a critical part of that identity.
Although the term “State Buddhism” was used by historian Kamala Tiyavanich (Tiyavanich, 1997) to refer to the use of Buddhism in Siamese nation building under King Chulalongkorn to centralize and unify the country, “Buddhist nationalism” may be a better term to describe the subjugation of Buddhism to the service of the emerging nation-state.
A key figure in this scheme was Prince-Patriarch Wajirayana (Pali: Vajiranana Varorasa) (1860-1921). As King Chulalongkorn's younger half-brother and the succeeding King Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925)'s uncle, the supreme patriarch was highly influential in generating nation-building doctrines based on Buddhist texts to establish the trinity of Nation-Religion-Monarchy as the heart of the Thai identity.
He was one of the royal leaders who "recognized that monks and monasteries constituted an institutional structure and educational network that extended throughout Siam. Twentieth-century Thai Buddhism was shaped through the creation of a national sangha organization centered in Bangkok, a national program of educational initially organized through monasteries, a standard curriculum for monks, a national system of approving and rewarding monks through a hierarchy of monastic titles and regularization of Buddhist rituals for monks and laity." (Swearer, 1999, 201-2).
Takhananan (2008, 69) summarized the role of this important figure as follow, "The establishment of the State ideology, which Wajirayana exercised, thought and exchanged with other ideologists, is a result of a collective consciousness among the Siamese elites on the existence of the State. This led to the initiation of the establishment of a modern Siamese State, as it recognizes that the need of an ideology to project the existence of the State both to the external world and to itself." This ideology "cited the sacred Suttas in the Tipitaka [Buddhist Canon] to imply or emphasize the existence of the State based on the reverence towards the Monarchy." (Takhananan, 2008, 14).
In his introduction to Takhanana's book, Professor Saichon Sattayanurak makes it even more concrete, "[The Supreme Patriarch] worked in a context intense imbued with State authority to establish the State ideology (including the meaning of the "Thai State" and "Thainess") as a basis in organizing power relationship in the Absolute Monarchy system... Wajirayana enthusiastically participated in this process. He used his cleverness in the "Buddhistization" of mundane concepts like "Thai State" and "Thainess" into dharmic ideas or the "Truth" according to Buddhist dharma, which are to be learned and observed by monks, novices, youths and other lay persons." (Takhananan, 2008, 10)
Saichon continues, "The power of the King's pejoratives enabled Wajirayana to induce monks and novices across the country into the centralized monastic education and ecclesiastical administrative system, as well as extend the centralized power to organize the administration and education of monks and novices in important cities even before the use of the Sangha Administration Act [of 1902.] ... Both the monastic education and ecclesiastical administration were important mechanisms for the propagation of the knowledge, ideology and meanings of institutions beyond the previous confinement of Bangkok to cities and rural areas across the country...Wajirayana had a collaborative role and proposed ideas in agreement with the king and the royalties in the establishment of the Nation-Religion-Monarchy ideology.“ (Takhananan, 2008, 10-11)
This subjugation of Buddhism in support of the nation-state would soon be legally formalized by the Sangha Act. "The more important features of the Sangha Administration Act of 1902 were: (1) the incorporation of all monks into a national structure; (2) the establishment of a hierarchical principle of authority; and (3) the establishment of a national system of clerical education." (Keyes, 1971, 555)
From here, it takes only a simple move of declaring allegiance to the law of the State to make the whole monkhood subjugated to the State. This is exactly what Wachirayan did by attaching a preface to the act when it was applied to the Northern monks some years later:
“Although monks are already subject to the law contained in the Viyana [monastic rules], they must also subject themselves to the authority which derives from the specific and general law of the State. In addition, they should also follow local customs which are not contrary to these other two sets of laws. In sum, monks must obey three types of laws: the law of the land, the Vinaya and custom. This Act is the law of the land; thus it should be known, understood, and followed correctly.” (Keyes, 1971, 25, quoted in Tambiah, 1976, 234)
Tambiah (1976, 235) noted that this makes local customs subordinated to the Vinaya and the State law for monks, and “when the law of the state is promulgated from Bangkok, a regional custom of an outlying province may be construed as being at variance with the orthodoxy of the capital’s norm.” The whole monkhood was also organized into a hierarchical structure – not unlike a political one – under the Supreme Patriarch, under the “support” (read “control”) of the government.
As a result of this nationalization and standardization of Buddhism, diverse local forms of Buddhism as well as indigenous beliefs -- or local identities -- came under threat from the center. "Regional differences in teaching and practice that characterized Thai Buddhism prior to 1902 were gradually reduced or eliminated. Nationwide Buddhist ceremony such as Visakha Puja were regularized and new ceremonies, such as Magha Puja, were created. Not only were the ritual chants in Pali regularized, recitations in regional dialects were discouraged. In the 1940's the government even authorized the burning of palm-leaf manuscripts written in the Yuan script of northern Thailand." (Swearer, 1999, 202-3).
King Vajiravudh would take this even further by confirming the status of Buddhism as the State religion, stating that "Religion, these days, cannot be separate from the nation. Religion and nation must be in harmony." He emphasize the idea that State religion was a necessity and all Thais must be firmly established in Buddhism which he declared as "the religion of our nation." (Takhananan, 2008, 47) He was also responsible for naming the trinity of “Chart” (nation), “Sasana” (religion) and Phramahakasat (monarchy) in his speech on May 26, 1911 to the Wild Tigers Corps, the nationalist group which he founded. (Jerryson, 2011)
Although no Thai constitutions after the 1932 revolution that ended absolute monarchy designated Buddhism as State religion, Buddhism maintains its position as the religion in the trinity of Nation-Religion-Monarchy which continues to be the national agenda until today some 80 years after the revolution. It is possible to say that the subjugation of Buddhism as state machinery is complete.
The histories of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand – as the major Theravada societies -- are interconnected over the centuries. All three countries have witnessed different dynamics between Buddhism and the States in what might be called “political Buddhism”.
In Sri Lanka, monks have long been actively involved in politics, and played an important part in the independence movement against British rule. A prime minister was assassinated by a monk. Monks have a political party, and also very vocal in the civil war against the majority-Hindu Tamil Tigers.
In Myanmar, monks are not always constantly engaged in politics as in Sri Lanka, but the world witnessed the mass protest by monks against the military junta in the saffron revolution of 1988. More recently, monks were also involved in the discrimination against Rohingyas and other Muslim minorities with marches in Mandalay and other cities. A notorious monk Wirathu emerged as “Buddhism’s Bin Laden” who incited hatred toward Muslims.
In comparison, Thai monks, on the surface, seems to be staying largely out of politics – except perhaps a few who were among the red-shirt protesters of 2009-2010. They cannot even vote – let alone form a political party.
But this is deceptive, as the whole structure has been absorbed as state machinery. Monks have also become a symbol of the State and played a significant role in the ongoing conflict. This is clearly seen in the case of the Thammathud and Thammacarik programs of the 1960’s where monks were sent to “spread the dharma” as well as government’s development message among ethnic groups such as the hill-tribe people in the Northern part of the country.
Keyes (1971) summarizes, “… and the purpose of the program was to strengthen sentimental ties (of Thai) with the tribal people and to create loyalties (of tribal people) to the nation through the development of strong beliefs in Buddhism.” (Quoted in Tambiah, 1976, 435)
It is therefore no wonder why monks also became targeted by the insurgents over the last ten years of the Deep South conflicts.
Although religious intolerance by certain Thai Buddhists also target people of other faiths such as Christianity, it is the Deep South issue which demonstrates the worst level of religious intolerance in Thailand.
Although over 90% of the Thai population identify themselves as Buddhists, they are the minority when it comes to the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where more than 76% of the populations are Muslim. Historically, these provinces were the center of what once was the territory of the sovereign Kingdom of Patani. Conquered by Siam in 1786, the Muslim Kingdom was formally recognized as under Siamese control by the Anglo-Siamese treaties of 1904 and 1909. (Croissant, 2007, 2)
As mentioned earlier, during the turn of the twentieth century King Chulalongkorn began to implement measures to integrate these provinces into the modernizing nation-state. These measures were continued by the nationalist and military governments and included prohibition of the use of the Malay language, restrictions on various cultural and religious practices and regulations of the independent Islamic schools. (Liow & Pathan, 2010) Being neither “Thai” nor “Buddhist”, the Malay-Muslims in the Deep South suffered at the hand of what could be called Buddhist nationalism of the Siamese State.
Although the situations are different in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand, all these three countries share one important aspect: Buddhism’s position at the center of State ideology.
Historically, leaders in these societies project themselves as “Buddhist leaders” following the example set by Asoka, who is portrayed as a great Buddhist king in Buddhist legends.
It is not doubted that Asoka was personally a Buddhist, but whether he ruled as a Buddhist king is a subject of controversy in light of the edicts.
Tambiah classified the two main schools of interpretations of the edicts (Tambiah, 1976, 54). This depends on how one interprets the ubiquitous word ‘dharma’. Some scholars considered Asoka to be a secular king, because his dharma seems generic and can come from other religions too, as there are no specific mentions of Buddhist terms such as ‘nirvana’.
However, Tambiah himself equated Asoka’s dharma with Buddhism and argued that the reason that ‘nirvana’ was not mentioned is because Asoka, as leader of lay society, was concerned only with the dharma for lay people. As he puts it, “[T]he layman’s duty [was] to support it but not to imitate its stringent life. (Tambiah, 1976, 60)
In contrast, Olivelle (2012) made a strong case that Asoka’s “dharma” is better seen as a civil religion – a term coined by Jean Jacques Rousseau and built upon by sociologist Robert Bellah (1967) – inspired by, yet distinct from, Buddhism. He argued that while the word dharma in Asoka’s edicts play a similar role as the word ‘God’ in the US’s civil religion. Both can be infused with different meanings by the audience according to their personal beliefs.
Olivelle proposed that Asoka played the role of an “actual universal emperor occupying the role of the Buddha in the civil universe” (2012, 178).
Yet, Asoka is not preaching Buddhism; he is propagating a civil religion that has the added and essential benefit of providing a religious anchor to his far-flung empire and a new legitimacy for his rule. Buddhism may have been the inspiration, but it was not the objective of Asoka’s composition and Dharma mission. (2012, 178)
The author agrees with Olivelle in that the religion that show from Asoka’s edicts was a secular – not a Buddhist – one. To support this position, Asoka is known from the edicts to have institutionalized new ceremonies in the forms of “dhamma-mangala” and monuments in the forms of stupas enshrining relics of great men – teacher, saint, and king. (Tambiah, 1976, 67). Both well qualify as elements of a civil religion.
Here the author proposes to look at Asoka’s rule not only from the text but also from the historical context.
More than any other king in Indian history, Asoka came closest to the Ancient Indian ideal of universal monarch (cakkavatti) through the use of power. Brahmanistic rites such as the horse sacrifice celebrated such supreme rule of the cakkavatti.
But when the Buddha "set in motion the wheel of dharma (dhammacakka)" with his first sermon, he gave a new meaning to ancient India's wheel symbolism, which previously referred not to just any wheel but that of the war chariot.
Asoka seemed to have had enough of wars after Kalinga, and turned away from the cycles of violence. The situation reminds of the West which emerged triumphant in the wreckage of two world wars. We could also argue that, Asoka then reigned as a hegemon in his known world, just as the US did after WWII.
A universal monarchy also requires a universal set of values, in order to pacify the world and avoid renewed violence. Tambiah (1976, 56) said “We can say that the passage from violence to the rule of dharma served as an efficacious ideology of pacification, political stability, and security. It is not that these considerations were merely a functional consequence of the dharma policy; they are possibly an aspect of its motivation as well.” As such it can be said that his “moral conquest” foreshadow the “liberal peace” paradigm.
Inspired by Buddhism, Asoka’s liberal dharma is clear contrast with the realpolitik of Kaultilya’s Arthasartha, the Ancient India’s equivalent to Machiavelli’s The Prince. (Tambiah, 1976, 57).
Gokhale (1966, 90-91) made the following comparison:
"Asoka’s approach to statecraft was based on the primacy of dharma over danda, and in this he specifically seems to adopt the Buddhist philosophy of the state… His ideal was the Righteous Ruler (dhammiko dhammaraja) of the Buddhist works. The ideal Buddhist king rules without the use of danda, or force, and in his hands the state ceases to be an instrument designed to uphold the order of the castes and sacerdotal privileges… A statecraft based on the normal use of force, as envisaged by Kautilya, is generally different from the administrative philosophy of Asoka which is based on the assumption that human nature is basically good." (emphasis added)
In the edicts, one can discern an embryonic Bill of Rights. Sakisyanz (1965) made an astute observation that “the Dharma duties and pieties, as proclaimed by Asoka, do not mention duties of man to the authority or the State, only the obligation this emperor felt toward his subjects, toward all man and indeed all beings.” (Quoted in Tambiah, 1976, 61)
For example, his proclamation that “Impartiality is desirable in legal procedures and punishment” (Pillar Edict 4) shows his concerns for persons who suffer imprisonment or torture, comparable to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. This is in great contrast to the different punishment prescribed by the Law of Manu, which vary depending on the caste of the accused. His welfare services (Pillar Edict VII) also have later parallel in the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
These characteristics are remarkable as they went beyond the negative rights of the Buddhist precepts – do not kill, steal, etc. – into the positive rights inspired by Buddhist teachings such as the Brahmavihara of loving kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and impartiality, among others.
Although his “Pax Asokana” was probably kept largely by his power, Asoka is also known for employing a number of high-ranking Dhamma Mahamatras – comparable to today’s ombudsmen – to ensure the compliance to his civil dharma. This is how he saw the mandate, in his own words:
“Now they work among all religions for the establishment of Dhamma, for the promotion of Dhamma and for the welfare and happiness of all who are devoted to Dhamma. They work among soldiers, chiefs, Brahmins, householders, the poor, the aged and those devoted to Dhamma-for their welfare and happiness-so that they may be free from harassment. They work for the proper treatment of prisoners and for the release of those who have a family to support, the sick and the aged. They work here, in outlying towns, in the women's quarters belonging to my brothers and sisters and among my other relatives. They are occupied everywhere. These Dhamma Mahamatras are occupied in my domain among people devoted to Dhamma to determine who is devoted to Dhamma, who is established in Dhamma and who is generous. This Dhamma edict has been written on stone so that it might endure long and that my descendants might act in conformity with it.”
Asoka may have unwittingly foreseen the collapse of his own paradigm in the last sentence. Unlike modern human rights which are formulated in a way that empowers every human being to claim their own rights against rulers, Asoka’s “Bill of Rights” was formulated as the ruler’s duty to his subjects – to love them like his own children – making these rights contingent upon successive rulers. It was not guaranteed that the successive kings would share his sense of compassion, and, more critically, that they would share his power to enforce the liberal peace which sustains human rights.
On Pillar Edict VII, Asoka declared “distribution of gifts from myself as well as from the queens” to all sects – Brahmin, Buddhist, the Ajivika ascetics, Jaina monks. (Tambiah, 1976, 64)
On Rock Edict VII he declared freedom of religion, “Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, desires that all religions should reside everywhere, for all of them desire self-control and purity of heart. But people have various desires and various passions, and they may practice all of what they should or only a part of it.” (Swaris, 2000, 111)
The most impressive speech he made on religions was inscribed on Rock Edict XII:
“Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, honours both ascetics and the house-holders of all religions, and he honours them with gifts and honours of various kinds. But Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, does not value gifts and honours as much as he values this: there should be growth in the essentials of all religions. Growth in essentials can be done in different ways, but all of them have as their root restraint in speech, that is, not praising one's own religion or condemning the religion of others without good cause. And if there is cause for criticism, it should be done in a mild way. But it is better to honour other religions for this reason. By so doing, one's own religion benefits and so do other religions while doing otherwise harms one's own religion and the religions of others. Whoever praises his own religion due to excessive devotion and condemns others with the thought "Let me glorify my own religion" only harms his own religion. Therefore, contact [between religions] is good. One should listen to and respect the doctrines professed by others. Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, desires that all should be well-learned in the good doctrines of other religions. Those who are content with their own religion should be told this: Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, does not value gifts and honours as much as he values that there should be growth in the essentials of all religions. And to this end many are working-Dhamma Mahamatras, Mahamatras in charge of the women's quarters, officers in charge of outlying areas and other such officers. And the fruit of this is that one's own religion grows, and the Dhamma is illuminated also.” (Swaris, 2000, 112-3)
Although Tambiah did not consider these as proof of Asoka’s secular rule, the author sides with Olivelle that “The civil religion of Dharma was a religion that could encompass and transcend particular religions.” (Olivelle, 2012, 174).
One way to determine whether Asoka was a Buddhist ruler or a secular one is to compare the way different rulers in different societies historically synthesize or separate Buddhist teachings and state agenda.
Comparing the Thammathud program with Asoka’s missions, we notice big differences. The Thammathud program was a politically motivated program which sent monks to spread the “dhamma” infused with the government’s development and anti-communist agenda. These monks are in fact state agents.
In contrast, there is no evidence that Asoka tried to influence the message of the missions of monks that was sent to propagate Buddhism in other lands. Instead, he used the lay Dhamma Mahamatras for his political agenda of establishing a civil religion of secular “human rights”.
Thammathud are in fact comparable to Dhamma Mahamatras as they both carry a nation-building duties. But even in this similarity, there’s also a stark difference. The Thammathud carries the nationalistic agenda – serving the states -- with Buddhism as the privileged religion. The Dhamma Mahamatras carries a broader values of basic rights – serving the entire population -- with equal respect for all religions.
Tambiah (1976, 64) suggested that the policies of domestication, political incorporation and even conversion to Buddhism followed by the government of Thailand, among others, toward allegedly primitive and bothersome hill tribes were based on the historical precedent of Emperor Asoka’s pronouncements on the spreading of the Buddhist dharma to the peoples located on the geographical margins of his empire.
The author would like to suggest that Tambiah was only half correct, because Asoka did attempt to spread his dharma to the margin of his empire, the dharma in question was not Buddhist dharma, but a secular dharma.
Although Southern Thailand was not specifically mentioned, it’s clear that the Malay-Muslim population was part of the Thai government’s past domestication policies.
Evidently such policies were misguided, as the thousands of lives lost during the last ten years have shown, and a lesson should be learned from the model pioneered by Asoka over two thousand years ago which – according to our new understanding – accord religious minorities with freedoms and rights for the prosperity of all.
Religious freedom is still a thorny subject in Thailand, as well as other traditionally Buddhist societies. However, such a problem is not new and have already been dealt with in the past. Surprisingly, many Buddhist principles are compatible with the modern concept of human rights and can be applied effectively to ensure peace and religious freedom as Asoka has shown.
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